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As state and local anti-discrimination provisions become more
and more comprehensive, physicians who refuse to treat patients for
reasons of sexual orientation or marital status are beginning to face
legal liability. Increasingly, physicians are invoking codes of medical
ethics alongside more familiar constitutional law claims in support
of their claim to insulation from legal liability. This Article explores
what medical ethics has to say about physicians who, for sincerely
held religious reasons, refuse to treat patients for reasons of sexual
orientation or marital status. The issue is explored through the lens
of a case recently decided by the California Supreme Court in which
infertility physicians refused to help a lesbian couple have a child
with the aid of artificial insemination. Through a close examination
of the provisions of medical ethics codes and the arguments based on
those codes raised in the California case, this Article concludes that
medical societies should not support carving out an exception from
anti-discrimination laws for physicians who, for reasons of religious
conscience, want to express their class-based biases in the clinic.
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I. THE CONTROVERSY
II. CODES OF MEDICAL ETHICS
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
The difficulty a liberal society confronts in seeking to protect
autonomy through rights is no more salient than in recent disputes
involving the exercise of medical conscience to refuse patients’ treat-
ment requests. The traditional understanding of the right balance in
this context is that although a “patient retains [a] negative liberty-
right to refuse medical treatment, this does not translate to a positive
* Professor of Law, City University of New York. J.D., Columbia, 1993; M.A.,
Columbia, 1989; B.A., Miami University, 1987. Many thanks to Caitlin De Sa for her
very able research assistance and to the City University of New York for its generous
research support.
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liberty-right to demand treatments or procedures that the health care
provider finds objectionable.”1 The traditional understanding rests
in part upon considerations of the dignity and autonomy of patients,
considerations that were only beginning to take shape at the dawn
of the bioethics movement and, in time, became its centerpiece.2
In the course of the maturation of bioethics as a distinct disci-
pline, concerns that the field is insufficiently attentive to issues of
social justice have emerged. Scholars of bioethics have begun to attack
the traditional understanding as inadequately protective of patients’
interests and rights, particularly patients in underrepresented groups.
The attack is especially pronounced in response to reproductive rights
and end-of-life controversies.3 In response is an increasingly public
and vigorous defense of physicians’ rights that some attribute to the
expansion of anti-discrimination regimes to include the activities of
private medical clinics, to new contraceptive technologies, and even
to doctors’ dissatisfaction with the changing climate of their profes-
sion within managed care systems.4
An emerging strategy for defenders of medical conscience is to
draw a distinction between treatments needed to heal and those
elected merely for convenience or to solve some perceived social, as
opposed to medical, problem.5 This strategy, used previously in the
context of voluntary sterilization for social reasons,6 is currently in
use in private infertility clinics where clinicians may respond to
1. THOMAS MAY, BIOETHICS IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY: THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK OF
BIOETHICS DECISION MAKING 9 (2002).
2. See GEORGE J. ANNAS, AMERICAN BIOETHICS: CROSSING HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HEALTH LAW BOUNDARIES 20-21, 23-24 (2005) (describing a post-WWII climate that
gave rise to modern bioethics and the historical human rights components that
influenced the modern bioethics movement).
3. See R. Alta Charo, The Celestial Fire of Conscience — Refusing to Deliver
Medical Care, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2471 (2005) (“[I]n recent years, with the abortion
debate increasingly at the center of wider discussions about euthanasia [and] assisted
suicide . . . nurses and pharmacists have begun demanding . . . a much broader freedom
to avoid facilitating a patient’s choices.”); Julian Savulescu, Conscientious Objection in
Medicine, 332 BRIT. MED. J. 294, 295 (2006) (noting that “doctors’ values have
reappeared as a right to conscientiously object to offering certain medical services” such
as abortion and reproductive services for gay couples); Rob Stein, A Medical Crisis of
Conscience, WASH. POST, Jul. 16, 2006, at A1 (describing medicine’s new practices and
controversies arising therefrom).
4. RICHARD E. ANDERSON, Introduction to MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A PHYSICIAN’S
SOURCEBOOK ix-x (Richard E. Anderson ed., 2005); David Orentlicher, The Influence of
a Professional Organization on Physician Behavior, 57 ALB. L. REV. 583, 585, 596 (1994)
(at time of publication author was Ethics and Health Policy Counsel for the American
Medical Association (AMA)); Stein, supra note 3.
5. Farr A. Curlin et al., The Authors Reply, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1891 (2007).
6. See CLIVE WOOD, VASECTOMY AND STERILIZATION 102 (1974) (“Some doctors, who
naturally regard themselves as healers rather than social workers, do not regard such
‘non-medical’ sterilization as an appropriate operation for them to perform.”).
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married couples who cannot conceive or who run the risk of producing
genetically compromised offspring as presenting a bona fide medical
disorder. These same clinicians may turn away single women or les-
bian couples for failing to present with a true medical problem, for pre-
senting with a problem of “medical futility,” 7 or for being capable
only of irresponsible parenthood.8 In many jurisdictions, anti-discrim-
ination provisions do not outlaw this refusal of treatment. Moreover,
the refusal of treatment is not so easily censurable under existing bio-
ethics principles as is the documented homophobic avoidance behavior
of health care providers toward HIV-infected gay men.9 Acknowledging
the complexity of discriminatory decision-making in infertility clinics,
this Article will explore how the commitments of bioethics and human
rights can help shape a principled response to the policing of par-
enthood in the delivery of reproduction-assisting technologies.
A case recently decided by the California Supreme Court, North
Coast Women’s Care Medical Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Superior
Court,10 tested whether a distinction can be made between prohibited
discrimination and protected religious conscience in the delivery of
medical treatment. The case involved an infertility clinic that refused
to treat a lesbian couple on religious grounds11 and remains a flash-
point fueling the ongoing controversy between patient advocates
and health care workers who “ ‘answer to God first.’ ”12 The legal
7. GREGORY E. PENCE, RE-CREATING MEDICINE: ETHICAL ISSUES AT THE FRONTIERS
OF MEDICINE 162-63 (2000).
8. See Simone Bateman, When Reproductive Freedom Encounters Medical
Responsibility: Changing Conceptions of Reproductive Choice, in CURRENT PRACTICES
AND CONTROVERSIES IN ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: REPORT OF A MEETING ON “MEDICAL,
ETHICAL, AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION” HELD AT WHO HEADQUARTERS
IN GENEVA, SWITZERLAND 17-21 SEPTEMBER 2001, at 320, 330 (Effy Vayena et al. eds.,
2002) (“Most physicians do not restrict their evaluation of a medical indication for treat-
ment to the physical symptoms. The choice of the most adequate treatment often takes
into consideration a patient’s finances, family surroundings, mental health, etc.”); M.M.
Peterson, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Equity of Access Issues, 31 J. MED.
ETHICS 280, 281-82 (2005) (noting that some clinicians purport to use “common sense”
to judge what reproduction is “appropriate” and who has adequate parenting ability). A
recent study revealed the lack of conformity between programs regarding what factors
would compromise one’s fitness to parent or would undermine child welfare. See Andrea
D. Gurmankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefs of Assisted Reproductive Technology
Programs, 83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61, 65-66 (2005) (explaining why certain categories
of people are turned away). The authors noted that the lack of conformity might be ex-
plained by disparities “in local mores, religious beliefs, and religiosity.” Id. at 66-67.
9. MEGAN-JANE JOHNSTONE, BIOETHICS: A NURSING PERSPECTIVE 397-98, 403-05 (3d
ed. 1999).
10. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189
P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008).
11. See Bob Egelko, State High Court to Hear Lesbian’s Case: Doctors Denied Her
Infertility Treatment on Religious Grounds, S.F. CHRON., June 15, 2006, at B5 (providing
an overview of the case and commentary).
12. Stein, supra note 3.
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issue before the court was whether a physician is constitutionally
insulated from an anti-discrimination law when the discrimination
arises out of the physician’s sincerely held religious beliefs.13 In
addition to the unsuccessful legal arguments they raised, the physi-
cian defendants argued that the Code of Medical Ethics governing the
medical profession permits doctors to refuse to treat a patient for
religious reasons as long as they provide an immediate and effective
referral to another physician who will perform the service.14 Ruling
against the physicians, the court took a rigidly doctrinal approach
that excluded any examination of the medical ethics arguments that
were so prominent in the briefs and at oral argument.15
This Article explores what medical ethics has to say about physi-
cians who, for sincerely held religious reasons, refuse to treat lesbian
couples or single women who wish to pursue parenthood through as-
sisted reproduction. Through a detailed look at the decision in North
Coast in Part I and how arguments based on the provisions of medical
ethics codes were employed by the parties in North Coast in Part II,
this Article finds that codes of medical ethics embody competing prin-
ciples that call the anti-discrimination commitments of medical soci-
eties into question. While these codes protect physicians in matters
of conscience, they also admonish physicians to obey local laws.16 As
state and local anti-discrimination provisions become increasingly
comprehensive, the inconsistency in these provisions and the lack
of clarity in the codes about how it should be resolved will become
more apparent. This Article concludes that the proper balance be-
tween these clashing medical ethics commitments, as supported by
law, policy, and the pronouncements of medical societies themselves,
is to disallow an infertility physician’s religious or conscience-based
refusal to assist lesbian couples and single women in reaching their
reproductive goals.
I. THE CONTROVERSY
North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group contracts with insur-
ers to provide infertility treatment to their subscribers.17 Guadalupe
13. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc., 189 P.3d at 962.
14. Petitioners’ Answer to Brief for Gay and Lesbian Med. Ass’n et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Real Party in Interest at 3-4, N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group,
Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008) (No. S142892) [hereinafter
Petitioners’ Answer to Brief for Gay and Lesbian Med. Ass’n et al.].
15. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc., 189 P.3d at 970-71.
16. CODE OF MED. ETHICS Op. 1.02 (Am. Med. Ass’n 2008-2009) (suggesting that only
in the “exceptional circumstance[ ] of unjust laws” should “ethical responsibilities . . .
supercede legal obligations”) (emphasis added).
17. Benitez v. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 367
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
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Benitez, a lesbian, received basic infertility treatment from North
Coast under the terms of her employer-provided health insurance
plan until the point where it was clear she would require intra-uterine
insemination (IUI).18 At that point, North Coast raised religious ob-
jections to helping her become pregnant, referred Benitez to a clinic
not covered by her insurance, and offered to reimburse her for the
cost of the treatment at the new location.19 Although her treatment
at the new clinic was successful, Benitez brought suit under the Unruh
Civil Rights Act,20 a California law specifically prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination in public accommodations.21
Benitez’s case was initially thrown out of court based on the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) law concern-
ing employee health benefit plans.22 The California Court of Appeal
overturned this decision, ruling that federal law does not exempt
health care providers from state civil rights laws.23 Upon a motion
for summary judgment, the trial court ruled in favor of Benitez on
the grounds that religious freedom did not vest the physicians with
an exemption from California’s anti-discrimination law.24 It rejected
North Coast’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that there were
triable issues of fact as to North Coast’s proffered reasons for discon-
tinuing Benitez’s treatment.25 On appeal, the court of appeal decided
that the trial court had been hasty in granting Benitez’s motion and
that a hearing on the issue of North Coast’s religious exemption claim
would be needed to determine if Benitez’s civil rights had actually
been violated.26 The California Supreme Court granted review,27
18. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc., 189 P.3d at 963-64.
19. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636, 640-41
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006), rev’d, 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008).
20. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2006).
21. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc., 189 P.3d at 964.
22. Benitez v. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc., No. GIC770165 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Apr. 15, 2002), rev’d, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). ERISA sets mini-
mum standards for private employers’ retirement and health benefit plans. Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
23. Benitez v. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 372-
74 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
24. Benitez v. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc., No. GIC770165, at 1, 3 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2004), vacated sub nom. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v.
Super. Ct., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), rev’d, 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008).
25. Id. at 2. At the time of the alleged discrimination, “the Unruh Act did not prohibit
discrimination based on marital status.” N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc., 40
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 643.
26. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636, 638,
648 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), rev’d, 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008).
27. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group v. Super. Ct., 139 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2006).
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framing the issue as follows: whether a physician is constitutionally
insulated from the law when the discrimination arises out of sincerely
held religious beliefs.28 In a unanimous decision, the court ruled that
a free exercise defense was ineffective against a claim of sexual orien-
tation discrimination brought under the Unruh Act.29 A little over
a year later, the parties settled the lawsuit for an undisclosed sum
of money.30
Several factors in North Coast rendered the free exercise clause
claim doctrinally weak. First, a free exercise claim is essentially one
positing that the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of reli-
gion has been abridged.31 Freedom of religion is a guarantee of free-
dom of religious belief;32 it does not guarantee an absolute freedom to
act pursuant to one’s religion.33 Older cases held that to burden the
freedom of religion, the government must have acted to advance a
compelling public interest and must possess no less restrictive means
at its disposal.34 In North Coast, there was no dispute that anti-
discrimination statutes advance several compelling public interests.35 
28. Issues Ordered Limited, Docket Entry of June 28, 2006, N. Coast Women’s Care
Med. Group, Inc., 139 P.3d 1 (No. D045438) (citing CAL. R. CT. 29(A)(1) (2006) (renumbered
2007)).
29. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189
P.3d 959, 962, 971 (Cal. 2008). The justices discussed the defendant physicians’ free
exercise claims under the Federal Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. 1, as well as the
California Constitution, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc.,
189 P.3d at 965.
30. Greg Moran, Lesbian’s Suit Over Procedure is Settled, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE,
Sept. 30, 2009, at B1; Press Release, O’Melveny & Myers LLP, O’Melveny Reaches
Settlement in Landmark Discrimination Suit (Oct. 5, 2009), available at http://www.omm
.com/newsroom/News.aspx?news=1298.
31. EDWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1200-01
(2d ed. 2002).
32. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
33. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (holding that the free exercise
of religion “remains subject to regulation for the protection of society”); Faheem-El v.
Lane, 657 F. Supp. 638, 645 (C.D. Ill. 1986) (finding that inmates’ free exercise of
religion is “subject to restriction when the limitations placed upon the right[] further
a legitimate governmental purpose”); Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm’n,
913 P.2d 909, 929 (Cal. 1996) (finding that property owner’s refusal to rent apartment
to an unmarried cohabitating couple violated the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA), CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12900-12966 (1980) (current version at §§
12900-12966 (2008)), and that compliance with FEHA’s anti-discrimination provisions
did not substantially burden the owner’s free exercise of religion).
34. Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263, 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1078 (1984).
35. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189
P.3d 959, 968 (noting that “[t]he [Unruh] Act furthers California’s compelling interest
in ensuring full and equal access to medical treatment irrespective of sexual orientation”);
see also Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 85 P.3d 67, 92 (Cal. 2004) 
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Today, Supreme Court jurisprudence holds that laws of general appli-
cability tend to fall beyond the reach of the free exercise clause;36 as
such, claims brought under this clause are strongest when leveled
against attempts to circumscribe institutional sacred rituals and prac-
tices.37 Since the Unruh Civil Rights Act does not inhibit religious
beliefs or ritualistic practices, it does not receive heightened scrutiny
under the free exercise clause.
Second, although anti-discrimination provisions sometimes explic-
itly exempt the activities of religious institutions from their ambit,38
(declaring elimination of gender discrimination a compelling state interest). Other munici-
palities also recognize the interest that inheres in anti-discrimination legislation. See, e.g.,
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE, KY., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-33(2) (1999) [hereinafter FAYETTE
CODE] (prohibiting “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity
within Fayette County”); PITTSBURGH, PA., CITY CODE § 651.01(e) (1997) (“Discrimination
in places of public accommodations . . . causes humiliation, embarrassment and incon-
venience to residents and visitors . . . [and] tends to create breaches of the peace, inter-
group tensions and conflicts and similar evils . . . .”). There is also much to be said about
the individual toll discrimination exacts. See, e.g., Broome v. Biondi, 17 F. Supp. 2d 211,
225-26 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (exploring research on the effects and social impact of racial
discrimination); Charlsie Dewey, In the Life Examines Doctors and Anti-Gay Bias, WINDY
CITY TIMES (Jan. 20, 2007), available at http://www.windycitymediagroup.com/gay/
lesbian/news/ARTICLE.php?AID=15274 (“I had no idea the depths that [discrimination]
reaches. Personally and psychologically, it destroys you.” (quoting Joanne Clark, Benitez’s
partner, on the effect of discrimination notwithstanding whether one ultimately receives
medical treatment)).
36. Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 878-79, 890, superceded by statute, Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Gonzales
v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Deo Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424, 435-36 (2006);
cf. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 93 (Cal. 2004) (“When followers of a particular sect enter
into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct
as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes
which are binding on others in this activity.” (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
261 (1982))); see also John Mikhail, The Free Exercise of Religion: An American Perspective,
in EIN NEUR KAMPF DER RELIGIONEN? STAAT, RECHT UND RELIGIOSE TOLERANZ 271, 277
(Matthias Mahlmann & Hubert Rottleuthner eds., 2006) (discussing the history of the
establishment clause and comparing it to German and other European free exercise of
religion questions).
37. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 423 (finding on behalf of a religious sect that utilized
hallucinogenic tea in rituals that the federal government failed in its burden to demon-
strate under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) that “[the government] ha[d]
a compelling interest in the uniform application of the Controlled Substances Act, such
that no exception to the ban on use of the hallucinogen [could] be made to accommodate
the sect’s sincere religious practice”); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534-35 (1993) (finding that city ordinance directly attacked
sacrificial rituals of Santería religion).
38. See, e.g., FAYETTE CODE § 2-33(7) (exempting certain religious institutions from
compliance with the county’s sexual orientation and anti-discrimination ordinance); see
also Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 84 (citing other examples of religious activities ex-
plicitly exempted from federal and state anti-discrimination statutes). Internationally,
a new Belgian law covering assisted reproduction gives infertility clinics the right to refuse
treatment for reasons of religious conscience. Guido Pennings, Decision-making Authority
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the Unruh Act does not. The Act forbids discrimination by business
establishments, and applies to business establishments of all kinds.39
It is thus a law of general application that requires no heightened
standard of review.40 Finally, although it is still an open question
whether the California Constitution embodies a stronger free exercise
guarantee than does the U.S. Constitution, the compelling justification
for the Unruh Act and the ease with which North Coast could opt out
of performing IUI for any patient meant that applying the Unruh
Act to North Coast’s treatment of Benitez survived strict scrutiny in
any event.41 In terms of a less restrictive alternative, the California
Supreme Court has opined that “any broader exemption increases the
number of women affected by discrimination in the provision of health
care benefits.” 42 Similarly, a special exemption for religious doctors
who object to serving gay and lesbian patients would simply increase
the number of people affected by discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. The court arguably believed it was simply disingenuous
for the clinic to assert that, since Benitez in the end received the ser-
vice she had originally sought, there should be no cognizable claim of
discrimination at all.
To place North Coast in context, it is important to understand
that the refusal of fertility treatment centers to serve lesbian couples
and single women is a notable problem.43 In the United States, where
most aspects of infertility clinics’ practice are not governmentally regu-
lated, studies indicate that many infertility clinics will deny access to
of Patients and Fertility Specialists in Belgian Law, 15 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 19, 21-22
(2007). This provision was included as a concession to Catholic clinics. Id. at 22.
39. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.5(a) (West 2007).
40. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 1212.
41. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189 P.3d
959, 968-69 (Cal. 2008).
42. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 85 P.3d 67, 94 (Cal. 2004).
43. See Patricia Baetens, Reproductive Services with Lesbian Couples, in GUIDELINES
FOR COUNSELLING IN INFERTILITY 109, 109-12 (Jacky Boivin & Heribert Kentenich eds.,
2002), available at http://www.eshre.com/binarydata.aspx?type=doc/psyguidelines.pdf
(explaining that many fertility centers do not accept lesbian couples for treatment); Jacky
Boivin, Reproductive Services with Single Women Without Partners, in GUIDELINES FOR
COUNSELLING IN INFERTILITY, supra, at 113, 113-16 (exploring cases in which conception
is prevented by a person’s social circumstances, such as being a single woman without
a partner, rather than one’s medical status); MPs Challenge Fertility Clinic Ban on
Lesbians, THE GUARDIAN, July 3, 2006, at 7, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/
2006/jul/03/politics.gayrights (highlighting the political response to fertility clinics’ refusal
to treat single women and lesbians); Lesbian Denied Fertility Treatment Wins Complaint,
CTVGLOBEMEDIA, Oct. 1, 2005, http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/
20050930/invitro_lawsuit_050930/20050930?hub=Health (reporting on a ruling of the
Quebec Human Rights Commission that ordered a fertility clinic to pay thousands of
dollars of compensation to a woman who was refused fertility treatments because she was
not accompanied by a man).
2010] MEDICAL CONSCIENCE AND THE POLICING OF PARENTHOOD 377
single men, gay couples and poor couples.44 This form of discrimination
in reproduction-assisting technologies has received some scholarly
treatment45 but has been the subject of very little reported litigation.46
As a practical matter, prohibitions on sexual orientation and marital
status are still uncommon,47 health clinics are sometimes exempt
from the ambit of public accommodations statutes,48 and screening
44. Gurmankin, supra note 8, at 65; Judy E. Stern et al., Access to Services at Assisted
Reproductive Technology Clinics: A Survey of Policies and Practices, 184 AM. J. OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY, 591, 596-97 (2001).
45. See, e.g., Bernard M. Dickens, Reproductive Health Services and the Law and
Ethics of Conscientious Objection, 20 MED. & L. 283, 284 (2001) (noting that “[t]he area of
medically assisted conception has more recently become a focus of conscientious objection”
among physicians); John H. Pearn, Gatekeeping and Assisted Reproductive Technology:
The Ethical Rights and Responsibilities of Doctors, 167 MED. J. AUSTL. 318, 318 (1997)
(arguing that anti-discrimination legislation in Australia obligates doctors to provide
“elective service[s] in circumstances that go against their conscience”); John A. Robertson,
Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE. W. RES. L. REV.
323, 325 (2004) (analyzing “the procreative liberty of gays and lesbians, the right to use
ARTs to form families, and the implications of such rights for family law and access to
ART services”).
46. In addition to Benitez, a Minnesota court has granted summary judgment to a
clinic accused of refusing to inseminate a lesbian because of her sexual orientation.
Holly J. Harlow, Paternalism Without Paternity: Discrimination Against Single Women
Seeking Artificial Insemination by Donor, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 173, 208-10
(1996). In Massachusetts, parties settled a similar lawsuit before trial. Id. at 212-13. For
further discussion of similar cases, see also Sheils v. Univ. of Pa. Med. Ctr., No. CIV.A.
97-5510, 1998 WL 134220, at *2-*3 (dismissing a suit brought against a clinic for violating
statutory prohibitions on disability discrimination because the plaintiffs had not been
denied infertility treatment); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to
Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 30 (2004) (describing a case
brought by a blind unmarried woman in Denver who was refused fertility treatment,
because the clinic determined that she had no partner to help her raise the child);
Elizabeth Weil, Breeder Reaction, MOTHER JONES, Jul.-Aug. 2006, at 32 (discussing the
dearth of public policy with respect to fertility clinics’ screening processes); N.Y. STATE
TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF ASSISTED REPROD. TECHS.:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUB. POL’Y (1998), available at
http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/taskfce/execsum.htm (providing an overview of the
state of assisted reproductive technology nationwide and in New York in the late 1990s).
47. Indeed, some statutes may exclude all but heterosexual married couples from
access to assisted reproduction. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 553 (West 2006)
(mandating that artificial insemination can only be performed if a husband and wife
request the use of the technique); see also Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., IFFS Surveillance
07, 87 FERTILITY & STERILITY S1, S17-S18 (Supp. I 2007) (reporting survey results that
show the majority of societies either formally or informally appear to prefer a traditional
heterosexual family when administering fertility treatments and restrict assisted repro-
ductive technology accordingly).
48. See Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y of Reprod. Med., Child-Rearing Ability and
the Provision of Fertility Services, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY 564, 566 (2004) [hereinafter
Child-Rearing Ability] (noting that “[r]eproductive rights protected under the United
States and state constitutions are rights against state interference, not rights to have
physicians or the state provide requested services”). Compare Duffy v. Ill. Dep’t of Human
Rights, 820 N.E.2d 1186, 1189 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that the provisions of the public
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practices vary widely from clinic to clinic.49 As is true in many areas
of medicine, infertility physicians prefer to self-regulate.50 There
exists little downward pressure on infertility clinics at present,
however, to adhere to any particular set of ethical guidelines, even
those promulgated by groups of specialty physicians. For example,
the voluntary accreditation program run by the American Society of
Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and its affiliate the Society for
Assisted Reproductive Technology does not require adherence to its
own explicit ethical commitment to nondiscrimination in the deliv-
ery of infertility treatment.51 In combination, these factors mean
that, when refused treatment at one clinic, applicants do not sue but
instead merely proceed to another.52
The issue of conscientious objection in medical care is sure to
arise with greater frequency as more state legislatures enact prohi-
bitions on sexual-orientation and marital-status discrimination.53
Currently, sexual-orientation and marital-status discrimination in
public accommodations is prohibited as follows:
accommodations statute in question do not apply to medical facilities or clinics, doctors’
offices, or health care facilities), with U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT: ADA TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL III-1.2000, available at http://www
.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/taman3.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2009) (indicating that the public
accommodations section of the Americans with Disabilities Act only applies to an exhaus-
tive list of facilities that do not specifically include health clinics, but does include offices
of health care providers and hospitals). The Illinois Human Rights Act was amended in
2007 and now explicitly covers the professional offices of health care providers. 775 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-101 (West 2007). But see Pennings, supra note 38, at 21-22 (describ-
ing a new Belgian law covering assisted reproduction that gives infertility clinics the right
to refuse treatment for reasons of religious conscience).
49. Gurmankin, supra note 8, at 66-67.
50. William R. Keye, Jr. et al., A Survey of the Practices and Opinions of the Domestic
Members of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY
536, 539 (2004).
51. David Adamson, Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technologies in the United
States, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: A READER 1, 8 (Thomas A. Shannon ed., 2004)
(describing the ASRM’s ethical pronouncements as “creat[ing] standards for self-
regulation”); Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y of Reprod. Med., Access to Fertility Treatment
by Gays, Lesbians, and Unmarried Persons, 86 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1333 (2006) [here-
inafter Access to Fertility] (articulating ethical commitment to non-discrimination but
not requiring adherence). Eighty-three percent of respondents to a survey of ASRM
members reported following ASRM Ethics Committee opinions. Keye, supra note 50,
at 537.
52. Laura Josephs, Therapist Anxiety About Motivation for Parenthood, in FROZEN
DREAMS: PSYCHODYNAMIC DIMENSIONS OF INFERTILITY AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 33,
37 (Allison Rosen & Jay Rosen eds., 2005).
53. See Jack S. Vaitayanonta, In State Legislatures We Trust?: The “Compelling
Interest” Presumption and Religious Free Exercise Challenges to State Civil Rights
Laws, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 886, 887-88 (2001) (describing the growing role of courts in
the application of anti-discrimination laws).
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SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION
PROHIBITIONS
! – both outlawed
! – sex. orient. only
! – marital status only
11/23/09
Notes: Washington, DC, prohibits both sexual orientation and marital
status discrimination in public accommodations.
What distinguishes a claim brought against an objecting physi-
cian under an anti-discrimination law from controversies involving
physicians who refuse to perform abortions or sterilizations is that
the former involves a physician’s refusal to provide a specific patient
with treatment that the physician regularly provides to others.54 This
means that the many laws that specifically allow religious physicians
or other health care personnel to refuse to perform abortions, sterili-
zations, or other procedures that violate their religious consciences55
54. See Jacob M. Appel, May Doctors Refuse Infertility Treatments to Gay Patients?,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jul.-Aug. 2006, at 20 (observing that society is unwilling to
tolerate physicians who single out entire classes of patients, “even when they act out of
sincere religious beliefs,” but is more tolerant of doctors who refuse to perform specific
procedures on anyone due to religious belief).
55. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2006) (prohibiting public officials from requiring indi-
viduals or institutions to perform abortion and sterilization procedures, despite receipt
of federal funds, when doing so would violate the individual’s moral convictions or religious
beliefs); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955.2(a) (West 2009) (providing immunity to individuals
and institutions who refuse to perform sterilization or abortion procedures on moral or
religious grounds); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(d) (West 2000) (providing that refusal
to perform an abortion or administer an abortifacient “shall not be a basis for any civil,
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do not apply in this case.56 Nor are regulations requiring pharmacists
to dispense prescribed medications particularly analogous.57 Instead,
criminal, administrative or disciplinary action”). For other state statutes, see AMERICANS
UNITED FOR LIFE, 2009 STATE LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS IN REVIEW 1 (2009), available at
http://www.aul.org/xm_client/client_documents/2009_State_Legislative_Session_Report
.pdf (categorizing relevant state legislative action across the fifty states). Such statutes
began to be passed in the wake of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Rachel Benson
Gold & Adam Sonfield, Refusing to Participate in Health Care: A Continuing Debate, THE
GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, Feb. 2000, at 8 (discussing how the states have re-
sponded to conscientious objections to perform abortions after Roe v. Wade); CATHERINE
WEISS ET AL., ACLU REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM PROJECT, RELIGIOUS REFUSALS AND
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 1 (2002) (discussing the emergence of refusal clauses pertaining
to certain reproductive health services following Roe v. Wade).
56. Other recent controversies in this vein include pharmacists who refuse to dispense
emergency contraception, see, for example, Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 524 F. Supp. 2d
1245, 1248 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (involving two pharmacists and one corporate pharmacy
that refused to dispense “Plan B” contraceptives due to religious and moral objections),
and religious institutions that resist mandates to cover prescription contraceptives for
their employees, see, for example, Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct.,
85 P.3d 67, 73 (Cal. 2004) (analyzing “a church-affiliated employer’s constitutional chal-
lenges to the Women’s Contraception Equity Act[,]” which required that certain health
insurance contracts cover contraceptives). The rights of pharmacists to refuse to dis-
pense emergency contraception is currently subject to laws and regulations that vary
widely from state to state. See Denise Hopkins & Marsha Boss, Pharmacists’ Right to
Refuse to Dispense Prescriptions Based on Moral Grounds: A Summary of State Laws and
Regulations, 41 HOSP. PHARMACY 1176 (2006) (summarizing state laws and regulations
concerning pharmacists’ rights to refuse to dispense prescriptions based on moral grounds).
Even though this Article wrestles with whether public policy supports special con-
sideration for medical practice, I do not here explore whether clinics are exempt from
anti-discrimination laws because they are not “public accommodations.” See supra note
48 and accompanying text. Such arguments have repeatedly failed. Although it is tempt-
ing to judge the medical profession as sufficiently honorable so as not to constitute a
mere business, it is nonetheless fair to say that business ethics now permeate the con-
duct of large numbers of physicians in the United States. See Alycia C. Regan, Regulating
the Business of Medicine: Models for Integrating Ethics and Managed Care, 30 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 635, 635-36 (1997) (examining the different models for integrating
“business . . . and medical ethics within a regulatory framework that governs” managed
care organizations); Edward B. Hirschfeld & Gail H. Thomason, Medical Necessity
Determinations: The Need for a New Legal Structure, 6 HEALTH MATRIX J.L.-MED. 3, 5
(1996) (arguing that business judgment, especially with respect to health plan coverage
decisions, plays an increasing role in medical decision-making).
Nor do I focus my discussion on how clinics might manage employees who refuse to
assist in the provision of certain treatments which, while constituting a refusal to provide
treatment, might not result in a patient being forced to go without care or seek treatment
elsewhere. For discussion of this subject, see Anne M. Dellinger & Ann Morgan Vickery,
When Staff Object to Participating in Care, 28 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 269, 269 (1995)
(describing the issues at play when “some aspect of a patient’s treatment offend[s] the
religious or ethical sensibility of a hospital staff member or employee”). The issue is
prominent in the provision of abortion but was also foreshadowed by the AIDS crisis,
when some nurses who deemed homosexuality immoral refused to attend to HIV-infected
gay men. See JOHNSTONE, supra note 9, at 402-03.
57. Hopkins & Boss, supra note 56, at 1176-77; see Stormans, 524 F. Supp. 2d at
1251 (interpreting a statute that allowed a pharmacist to decline to fill a prescription but
prohibited obstruction of patient’s effort to obtain it).
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the theory advanced by the objecting physicians in North Coast was
that the right to express one’s religious beliefs is so central to our de-
mocracy that it takes priority even over important anti-discrimination
laws.58 As a matter of good public policy, the claim was also made that
exempting religious doctors from anti-discrimination laws will lead
to greater openness in doctor-patient interactions and to increased
availability of medical services overall.59 As we have already seen, the
idea that the interests of those who desire non-discriminatory access
to public accommodations as guaranteed by the Unruh Act must be
balanced against the religious interests of those who choose to offer
services for profit in the public marketplace was vigorously rejected
by the California Supreme Court.60 Given the strength of federal and
California precedent on this issue, it was not surprising that North
Coast and their amici attempted to bolster their arguments with ref-
erences to codes of medical ethics.61 Although codes of medical ethics
in general “have no force and effect outside of the private, voluntary
associations in which they are adopted,” 62 the courts on many occa-
sions have been deferential to the customs and ethical practices of
physicians, and often cite codes of medical ethics as trustworthy and
authoritative support for legal decision-making in cases involving
the practice of medicine.63 The next section explores the unexpected
lack of clarity within medical codes of ethics on the issue of whether
religious physicians may discriminate against their patients.
58. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189
P.3d 959, 967 (Cal. 2008).
59. Brief for Christian Med. and Dental Ass’ns as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner’s Writ of Mandate at 2, 13-14, N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v.
Super. Ct., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (No. D045438) [hereinafter Brief
for Christian Med. and Dental Ass’ns].
A new Belgian law covering assisted reproduction gives infertility clinics the right to
refuse treatment for reasons of religious conscience. Pennings, supra note 38, at 21-22.
This provision was included as a concession to Catholic clinics. Id. at 22.
60. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group Inc., 189 P.3d at 966-67.
61. Brief for Christian Med. and Dental Ass’ns, supra note 59, at 5-7; Petitioners’
Answer to Brief for Gay and Lesbian Med. Ass’n et al., supra note 14, at 3-7.
62. Petitioners’ Answer to Brief for Gay and Lesbian Med. Ass’n et al., supra note 14,
at 6. This statement is overbroad, as it overlooks the fact that individual boards of medical
licensure sometimes condition the retention of a medical license upon adherence to the
AMA’s Code of Medical Ethics. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B)(18) (West
2009) (describing the state medical board’s power and authority to “limit, revoke, or
suspend an individual’s certificate to practice,” subject to certain limitations, for failing
to adhere to the AMA Code of Medical Ethics).
63. See AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS 376-83 (2008-2009) (compiling
cases that have cited to provisions of the AMA Code of Medical Ethics); JOSÉ MIOLA,
MEDICAL ETHICS AND MEDICAL LAW: A SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP 9, 13 (2007) (discussing
the trend of judges deferring to the tenets of codes of medical ethics).
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II. CODES OF MEDICAL ETHICS
What is initially intriguing about the use of medical ethics codes
to defend physicians is that principles of medical ethics were devel-
oped to protect patients, and this continues to be the governing sense
of why medical ethics rules exist in the first place. Indeed, the pre-
amble to the American Medical Association’s Code of Medical Ethics
states that the “body of ethical statements [was] developed primarily
for the benefit of the patient,” and emphasizes physician “responsi-
bility” and “honorable behavior.” 64 It is difficult to find vindication
of physicians’ rights as against their responsibility to their patients
in the AMA Code. It is perhaps understandable as a result that there
is fear that protecting patients may at times come at the expense of
protecting physicians.
Although codes of medical ethics were a prominent feature of
North Coast in the arguments of both the parties and the many
amici,65 what, if any, guidance they provide for the resolution of a
case like North Coast remains nebulous. Given their prominence in
the many submissions to the court, it is at first surprising that the
supreme court’s unanimous decision makes absolutely no mention
of these codes. What is more surprising, however, is that the briefs of
the various medical society amici exhibit such striking disagreement
about what the ethics rules governing their profession require.
None of the parties or the amici could ignore the prominent
prohibition on discrimination against potential patients that appears
in the AMA’s Code of Medical Ethics.66 Nor was it a matter of dis-
pute that a religious physician could permissibly refuse to provide a
potential patient with a procedure to which he had a religious ob-
jection,67 as long as the objection was to the procedure itself and not
motivated by some protected status of the potential patient.68 It is
64. CODE OF MED. ETHICS pmbl. (Am. Med. Ass’n 2008-2009).
65. Brief for Christian Med. and Dental Ass’ns, supra note 59, at 5-7; Petitioners’
Answer to Brief for Gay and Lesbian Med. Ass’n et al., supra note 14, at 3-7.
66. See CODE OF MED. ETHICS Op. 9.12 (2009), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion9012.shtml (prohibiting
physician’s discrimination against potential patients on the basis of “race, color, religion,
national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, or any other basis that would constitute
invidious discrimination”); see also CODE OF MED. ETHICS Op. 10.05(2)(b) (prohibiting
physician’s discrimination against potential patients on the basis of “race, gender, sexual
orientation, or any other criteria that would constitute invidious discrimination”).
67. See CODE OF MED. ETHICS Op. 10.05(3)(c) (stating that physicians may decline a
potential patient when “[a] specific treatment sought by an individual is incompatible
with the physician’s personal, religious, or moral beliefs”).
68. See id. Op. 10.05(3) (making clear that the objection to a procedure on religious
or moral grounds is not permitted when it is based on a criterion “that would constitute
invidious discrimination” against the patient).
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thus unsurprising that the religious organizations and other amici
that filed amicus briefs in support of North Coast frequently empha-
sized the point that “medical ethics standards . . . consistently main-
tain that a physician should be allowed to refuse to provide specific
medical treatment or procedures.” 69 None of these provisions, how-
ever, applied to Benitez. She was already a patient of North Coast,
not merely a potential patient, at the time her cause of action arose,70
and North Coast did not have any general religious objections to IUI
as a procedure.71 North Coast’s specific objection was to providing IUI
to someone like Benitez.72
The question then became which, if any, of the provisions of the
Code of Medical Ethics did apply to the facts of North Coast. In one
instance, North Coast argued that medical ethics codes are so gen-
eral that they do not apply when doctors object on religious grounds
Unsurprisingly, as a matter of advocacy, North Coast pulled Opinion 10.05(3)(c) out
of its context to claim that it gave a physician an absolute right to refuse to perform a
treatment if it conflicted with his religious beliefs. Petitioners’ Answer to Brief for Gay
and Lesbian Med. Ass’n et al., supra note 14, at 4.
69. Brief for Christian Med. and Dental Ass’ns, supra note 59, at 5; Brief for Cal.
Med. Ass’n Supporting Petitioners at 7-11, N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v.
Super. Ct., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (No. D045438) [hereinafter Brief for
Cal. Med. Ass’n]. The Christian Medical and Dental Associations cited its own tenets and
those of the Islamic Medical Association of North America as support for the proposition
that religious doctors have a right to refuse specific treatments to specific patients. The
Christian group admonishes its members to offer in vitro fertilization only to married
couples; the Islamic group, in keeping with the dictates of Islam, permits doctors to provide
assisted reproduction only to married couples who can use their own gametes and uterus.
Brief for Christian Med. and Dental Ass’ns, supra note 59, at 7. The Roman Catholic
Church is also mentioned in this brief, but of course that church rejects all reproduction-
assisting technologies. Id. at 8; See also Martin L. Cook, Guest Editorial: Reproductive
Technologies and the Vatican, ISSUES IN ETHICS (Spring 1988), available at http://www
.scu.edu/ethics/publications/iie/v1n3/homepage.html (explaining that the Vatican opposes
“all technological interventions into the process of human reproduction”). There is
disagreement within the church as to whether the techniques of gamete intrafallopian
transfer and tubal ovum transfer are consistent with church doctrine. See Richard C.
Sparks, Helping Childless Couples Conceive, ST. ANTHONY MESSENGER (Apr. 1997),
available at http://www.americancatholic.org/Messenger/Apr1997/feature1.asp (“[T]he
Catholic Church has made no definitive or official universal pronouncement about these
two procedures.”).
70. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189
P.3d 959, 963 (Cal. 2008) (indicating Benitez had been in North Coast’s care for almost
a year).
71. Id.
72. Benitez and her supporters made this point several times in their various sub-
missions. Answer of Real Party in Interest Guadalupe T. Benitez to Brief for Christian
Med. and Dental Ass’ns as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners’ Writ of Mandate at
4, N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006) (No. D045438) [hereinafter Answer of Real Party in Interest to Brief for
Christian Med. and Dental Ass’ns]; Brief for Anti-Defamation League et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Real Party in Interest at 44, N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc.,
40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636 (No. D045438) [hereinafter Brief for Anti-Defamation League et al.].
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to performing a specific procedure for a specific patient and provide
the patient a referral for the same procedure.73 North Coast conceived
of this refuse-and-refer mechanism as striking the proper balance be-
tween the “legal rights of a patient and the legal and ethical rights of
a physician” in such a case.74 Moreover, it characterized this mecha-
nism as the one most medical ethicists prefer.75 The California Medical
Association (CMA) agreed, adding that the physician should be re-
sponsible for any additional cost arising from the refusal-and-referral
mechanism only if he had agreed to pay or had contracted with a man-
aged care organization to provide care.76 Despite their agreement on
the proper balance to be struck in the case, the CMA and North Coast
did not see the collision between refuse-and-refer balancing and anti-
discrimination law in the same way. Whereas the CMA perceived a
conflict between a physician’s conscience and anti-discrimination pro-
hibitions,77 North Coast’s position was that any discrimination in-
herent in the refuse-and-refer mechanism would not run afoul of anti-
discrimination law, since it would not be “discriminatory against gay
people per se” but would have a mere “incidental impact on [a physi-
cian’s] ability to provide one treatment, IUI, to the aforementioned
group of people.” 78 Despite this disagreement on the exact interplay
between refuse-and-refer and anti-discrimination law, both North
Coast and the CMA agreed that the use of the refuse-and-refer device
by North Coast should excuse the clinic from liability.79
Like North Coast, the CMA found little support for the refuse-
and-refer approach beyond those provisions cited supra80 that apply
only to potential patients. The CMA sought, however, to bolster its
support for this balance by explaining how the approach would en-
hance communication between doctors and their patients and would
ensure the greatest availability of health care to the public, since
religious physicians would not be compelled to limit their practices.81
These themes were similarly prominent in North Coast’s appellate
73. Petitioners’ Answer to Brief for Gay and Lesbian Med. Ass’n et al., supra note 14,
at 1, 3-4, 6.
74. Petitioners’ Answer to Brief for Anti-Defamation League et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Real Party in Interest at 2, N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc., 40 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 636 (No. D045438) [hereinafter Petitioners’ Answer to Brief for Anti-Defamation
League et al.].
75. Petitioners’ Answer to Brief for Gay and Lesbian Med. Ass’n et al., supra note 14,
at 6 (citing Farr A. Curlin et al., Religion, Conscience, and Controversial Clinical Practices,
356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 593, 599-600 (2007)).
76. Brief for Cal. Med. Ass’n, supra note 69, at 15-16.
77. Id. at 11.
78. Petitioners’ Answer to Brief for Anti-Defamation League et al., supra note 74, at 12.
79. Id. at 11-13; Brief for Cal. Med. Ass’n, supra note 69, at 1, 14.
80. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
81. Brief for Cal. Med. Ass’n, supra note 69, at 12-13.
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brief submitted to the California Supreme Court and the Christian
Medical and Dental Association’s (CMDA) amicus brief submitted in
the court of appeal.82
In her response to the CMA brief, Benitez expressed dismay at
the many contradictions it contained.83 But in fact, the CMA amicus
brief was consistent with North Coast’s position as described above. It
was understandable that the CMA perceived North Coast’s “conun-
drum” as how to “balance their own religious beliefs and their non-
discrimination obligations,” 84 while Benitez perceived it as a case
about the primacy of nondiscrimination obligations.85 The value of
the CMA brief for understanding medical ethics lies in its clear reve-
lation of the contradiction in the AMA Code of Medical Ethics itself:
physicians must not discriminate, but are entitled to exercise their
religious conscience when practicing medicine.86 The CMA saw the
resolution of the conflict as one requiring balancing.87 Benitez saw
the issue as determining which tenet controlled, nondiscrimination
obligations or religious conscience, with no need for balancing once it
was determined that nondiscrimination obligations control.88 In con-
trast to Benitez’s allegation that it was being contradictory, the CMA
did recognize “the overlap and potential conflict of both issues” 89 but
was not ready to make a blanket statement “that religious freedom
does not permit discrimination.” 90 Admittedly, the CMA did misstate
the facts of North Coast in stating that the ultimate factual issue in
the case was “whether the defendants were discriminating against
plaintiff based upon her sexual orientation or abiding by their reli-
gious beliefs.” 91 Benitez and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) felt
82. See Answer Brief on the Merits at 52-53, N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group,
Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008) [hereinafter Answer Brief
on the Merits] (regarding greater access to care); Brief for Christian Med. and Dental
Ass’ns, supra note 59, at 11-14 (regarding open and honest communication).
83. Answer of Real Party in Interest Guadalupe T. Benitez to Brief for Cal. Med. Ass’n
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc.
v. Super. Ct., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (No. D045438) [hereinafter Answer
of Real Party in Interest to Brief for Cal. Med. Ass’n].
84. Brief for Cal. Med. Ass’n, supra note 69, at 2.
85. See Answer of Real Party in Interest to Brief for Christian Med. and Dental Ass’ns,
supra note 72, at 5 (“Even the sincerest of beliefs do not authorize those engaged in
commercial enterprises to implement those beliefs by harming third parties.”).
86. Brief for Cal. Med. Ass’n, supra note 69, at 4, 6.
87. Id. at 19.
88. See Answer of Real Party in Interest to Brief for Christian Med. and Dental Ass’ns,
supra note 72, at 8-10 (focusing on the anti-discrimination tenet as controlling without
discussing the need for balance).
89. Brief for Cal. Med. Ass’n, supra note 69, at 11.
90. Answer of Real Party in Interest to Brief for Cal. Med. Ass’n, supra note 83, at 2.
91. Brief for Cal. Med. Ass’n, supra note 69, at 12. In another iteration of this either/or
formulation, the CMA characterized the ultimate issue for the jury as whether “religious
belief was the basis for the refusal, or if defendants were merely discriminating against
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it necessary to emphasize that expression of religious beliefs some-
times assumes discriminatory forms,92 but the North Coast physi-
cians had never very forcefully denied that their religious refusal was
discriminatory. They simply felt that their particular way of discrimi-
nating could not be the subject of any legal sanction.93
In contrast to the positions taken by North Coast and its amici,
the medical societies and other organizations supporting Benitez char-
acterized medical ethics as vigorously vindicating nondiscrimination
in the delivery of medical care without exception.94 This was a salient
feature of briefs filed in the court of appeal by the ADL and fifteen
other associations and advocacy groups, and in the supreme court by
the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association (GLMA) and three other
physician and medical student groups, concerned that a decision for
North Coast would have a negative impact on access to health care.95
In essence, these briefs took the CMA and the CMDA to task for
omitting specific language in the AMA’s policies that a physician’s
conscience deserves respect, but not to the extent of permitting dis-
crimination against patients on the basis of “race, color, religion,
national origin, sexual orientation, or any other basis that would con-
stitute invidious discrimination.” 96 The briefs effectively underscore
the selective use of language in the CMDA brief, but do so merely by
referring to the same inapplicable provisions described above.97 The
ADL and the GLMA made inconsistent statements about whether
the CMA prohibits discrimination against potential patients or all
patients.98 Beyond this, both briefs make reference to other AMA Code
plaintiff?” Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
92. Answer of Real Party in Interest to Brief for Christian Med. and Dental Ass’ns,
supra note 72, at 5-6; Answer of Real Party in Interest to Brief for Cal. Med. Ass’n, supra
note 83, at 12-13; Brief for Anti-Defamation League et al., supra note 72, at 5.
93. Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 82, at 38-43.
94. Brief for Gay and Lesbian Med. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Real
Party in Interest at 6-15, N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County
Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008) (No. S142892) [hereinafter Brief for Gay and Lesbian
Med. Ass’n et al.]; Brief for Anti-Defamation League et al., supra note 72, at 18-20.
95. The fifteen other associations and advocacy groups are: American Academy of HIV
Medicine, American Medical Students Association, Asian Pacific American Legal Center
of Southern California, Bienestar Human Services, California Latinas for Reproductive
Justice, California Pan-Ethnic Health Network, California Women’s Law Center, Coalition
for Humane Immigrant Rights of L.A., Gay and Lesbian Medical Association, International
Association of Physicians in AIDS care, Latino Coalition for a Healthy California, Mautner
Project: The National Lesbian Health Organization, Mexican American Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, National Center for Lesbian Rights, and National Health Law
Program. Brief for Anti-Defamation League et al., supra note 72, at 1. The three other
physician and medical student groups are: American Medical Student Association,
American Academy of HIV Medicine, and International Association of Physicians in AIDS
Care. Brief for Gay and Lesbian Med. Ass’n et al., supra note 94, at 1.
96. Brief for Anti-Defamation League et al., supra note 72, at 20-24.
97. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
98. Brief for Gay and Lesbian Med. Ass’n et al., supra note 94, at 12 (stating the CMA’s
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of Medical Ethics opinions and AMA House of Delegates resolutions
having to do with a physician’s duty to respect the law, uphold human
rights, and work to promote patients’ welfare and best interests,99 all
of which reflect the AMA’s high degree of respect for patients and its
commitment to human rights and nondiscrimination but none of
which, unfortunately, is pointed enough to dispose of a case like
North Coast. As if recognizing this, the ADL admonished the court
to “read together” the various code provisions and proclamations in
order to come up with “clear principles of non-discrimination.”100
The confusion over the AMA’s position is best reflected in the
CMA’s abrupt reversal of position shortly after its original submission
supporting North Coast created a stir in the media.101 The CMA’s
Notice of Errata recanted its earlier position that discrimination on
the basis of religious belief placed physicians in a legal and ethical
conundrum that required balancing the interests of the physician and
the patient through a refuse-and-refer mechanism.102 Its new posi-
tion was unequivocal: “CMA would never support the claim that a
physician’s religious freedom authorizes discrimination based on race,
nationality or sexual orientation.”103 The CMA explained its abrupt
turnabout as the result of careless editing of the original brief.104 In
its errata, the CMA also stated that an outcome adverse to Benitez
could still be squared with the nondiscrimination principle, since
North Coast alleged it had refused to treat Benitez because of her
marital status, a classification the CMA stated was not protected
position as “physicians may not refuse to care for patients based on race, gender, sexual
orientation or any other criteria that would constitute invidious discrimination”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Brief for Anti-Defamation League et al., supra note 72, at 24
(stating the CMA’s position as “physicians may not decline to accept patients because of . . .
sexual orientation, or any other basis that would constitute invidious discrimination”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
99. Brief for Gay and Lesbian Med. Ass’n et al., supra note 94, at 7-10; Brief for Anti-
Defamation League et al., supra note 72, at 21-24.
100. Brief for Anti-Defamation League et al., supra note 72, at 22. The ADL also
argued that there is a professional consensus within medicine that is condemnatory of
discrimination. In support, it cited the policies of several hospitals, medical societies, and
other groups working in the area of health care delivery. Id. at 24-28.
101. Wyatt Buchanan, Sights Set on State High Court in Case of Lesbian Refused
Treatment: Appellate Judges Said Doctors Could Cite Their Religious Beliefs, S.F. CHRON.,
Dec. 8, 2005, at B3; Greg Moran, Court to Hear Insemination Case: Lesbian’s Suit
Spurred by Denial of Treatment, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, May 27, 2008, at A1,
available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20080527/news_ln27insem.html;
Kenneth Ofgang, State Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Lesbian Insemination Case,
METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE, June 15, 2006, at 1.
102. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
103. Notice of Errata Regarding Amicus Brief of Cal. Med. Ass’n at 2, N. Coast
Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
(No. D045438).
104. Id. at 4.
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under California law.105 This statement by the CMA contained at
least two erroneous statements, one of which required correction by
an additional notice of errata.106
Benitez was in an ongoing physician-patient relationship at the
time her cause of action arose.107 North Coast’s discontinuation of her
treatment at the point it did was arguably neglect or even abandon-
ment. It is thus odd that none of the parties to or amici in this case
considered the applicability of the AMA Code of Medical Ethics pro-
visions having to do with the neglect of patients and when a physician
may ethically refuse to treat a patient but must refer her elsewhere.
Opinion 8.11 reads, “[p]hysicians are free to choose whom they will
serve. The physician should, however, respond to the best of his or her
ability in cases of emergency where first aid treatment is essential.
Once having undertaken a case, the physician should not neglect the
patient.”108
Opinion 10.01 describes the fundamental character of a physician-
patient relationship as a “collaborative effort” and a “mutually respect-
ful alliance” in which the parties share the responsibility for making
health care decisions.109 Within this framework, patients have the
right to be treated with courtesy and dignity and have the right to
continuity of health care. “The physician may not discontinue treat-
ment of a patient as long as further treatment is medically indicated,
without giving the patient reasonable assistance and sufficient oppor-
tunity to make alternative arrangements for care.”110 Added to this is
the understanding from Opinion 10.015 that a doctor-patient relation-
105. Id. at 2-3.
106. Notice of Additional Errata Regarding Amicus Brief of Cal. Med. Ass’n at 2-3, N.
Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636 (No. D045438) (clarifying
that while the Unruh Act did not explicitly outlaw marital status discrimination at the
time Benitez’s cause of action arose, other statutory provisions in California do prohibit
marital status discrimination). The second erroneous statement concerned North Coast’s
characterization of its refusal as marital status discrimination. North Coast’s initial
answer did not raise the affirmative defense of marital status discrimination. See Petition
for Review of Real Party in Interest Guadalupe T. Benitez at 3, N. Coast Women’s Care
Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008) (S142892),
available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/benitez-v-north-coast-womens
-care-medical-group.html (noting that “defendants asserted in an initial motion for sum-
mary adjudication that they refused to treat plaintiff because she is a lesbian. . . . Later,
however, when it became beneficial for defendants to change their story, they claimed
in a subsequent motion for summary adjudication that that had not been the reason and
that, instead, they refused to treat plaintiff because she is unmarried.”). North Coast
might have been legally estopped from raising this theory at trial. See Petition for Review
of Real Party in Interest, supra, at 17-24 (discussing the theory of judicial estoppel).
107. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc., 189 P.3d 959, 963-64.
108. CODE OF MED. ETHICS Op. 8.11 (Am. Med. Ass’n 2008-2009).
109. Id. Op. 10.01.
110. Id. Op. 10.01(5).
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ship is a fiduciary relationship in which the physician’s self-interest
is subordinate to his duty to promote the patient’s best interests and
advocate for her welfare.111
It may be possible to read into these provisions the anti-discrimi-
nation language of Opinions 9.12 and 10.05, the Opinions that cap-
tured the attention of the various players in North Coast, but one
cannot do so directly, since those provisions apply to the acceptance
or denial of potential patients by their own explicit terms.112 It may be
a good idea to assume from the specific language of the AMA Code
of Medical Ethics Principles that a physician who decides to discrim-
inate in the course of an ongoing physician-patient relationship is
not respectful of the law, respectful of human rights and dignity, or
even supportive of access to medical care for all people.113 Or perhaps
the Principles’ Preamble can be read together with Opinions 10.01
and 10.015 to conclude that it is simply not honorable or respectful
for a physician to discriminate, because it is of no benefit to a patient,
does not promote her best interests and welfare, and arguably exacer-
bates rather than alleviates her suffering.114 Unfortunately, the vague
and general language of these provisions when contrasted with the
forceful nondiscrimination language embodied in the provisions appli-
cable to potential patients raises doubt, as North Coast noted,115 about
whether any of this is suited to assist a court, or an AMA disciplinary
board for that matter,116 in resolving a case like North Coast.
Consider as well how divergently physicians themselves may be
tempted to interpret these provisions. A religious physician might
be tempted to invest the language of AMA Opinion 10.015, for ex-
ample, with an admonition not to “assist [patients] in harming them-
selves . . . . If we truly believe that a given procedure violates patients’
intrinsic human dignity, then our responsibility to our patients man-
dates that we not help them procure that procedure.”117 Consider as
111. Id. Op. 10.015.
112. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
113. CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS princs. I, III, and IX (Am. Med. Ass’n 2008-2009).
114. Id. at pmbl., Op. 10.01, Op. 10.015.
115. Petitioners’ Answer to Brief for Gay and Lesbian Med. Ass’n et al., supra note 14,
at 6-7.
116. The AMA’s Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs is vested with the power to
“censure, or place on probation the accused physician[,] or suspend or expel him or her
from AMA membership as the facts may justify.” COUNSEL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, RULES OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS IN
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CASES (2009), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
about-ama/our-people/ama-councils/council-ethical-judicial-affairs/governing-rules/rules
-cases-original-jurisdiction.shtml.
117. Patrick O’Connell, M.D., & Jacques Mistrot, M.D., To the Editor, 356 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1891 (2007).
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well that the wording of both Opinions 10.01 and 10.015 speak in
terms of “medical problems,” “medical condition,” and “alleviate
suffering.”118 Such terms do not disable physicians from concluding
that those presenting with “social” infertility may not present with
a “medical” problem. Under this reasoning, even a referral would
not be necessary.119
Exacerbating the problem is that physicians are very used
to refuse-and-refer as a way to address having to deal with many
sorts of “problem” patients.”120 Bioethicists writing on physician con-
science have likewise endorsed refuse-and-refer.121 One of these, writ-
ing specifically about North Coast, described refuse-and-refer as the
proper way to resolve Benitez’s lawsuit.122 In short, the CMA is not
a mere outlier in suggesting balancing as the proper resolution of
North Coast.
Although the AMA’s position on religious refusals that consti-
tute unlawful discrimination remains unclear, it is important to
note that other medical societies have stronger admonitions and
warnings with respect to discrimination against lesbians and single
women in the treatment of infertility. The relevant ethical pronounce-
ments of the ASRM, for example, specifically state that physicians
should conform their conduct to local anti-discrimination laws. They
also disapprove of failing to offer infertility treatments to gays,
lesbians and the unmarried on the same terms as those offered to
married heterosexual couples.123 The Ethics Committee Report 
118. CODE OF MED. ETHICS Op. 10.01, Op. 10.015 (Am. Med. Ass’n 2008-2009).
119. Curlin et al., supra note 5, at 1891-92 (taking the position that while doctors
should not refuse to treat sick people on the basis of sexual orientation, there are some
conditions that are not sicknesses and in such cases there need be no referral, even though
the physician should let the patient know he objects).
120. See, e.g., Rahul K. Parikh, Showing the Patient the Door, Permanently, N.Y. TIMES,
June 10, 2008, at F6 (claiming that a physician has a right to dismiss a patient, if reason-
able notice and other treatment options are given to the patient).
121. Adrienne Asch, Two Cheers for Conscience Exceptions, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Nov.-Dec. 2006, at 11; see Savulescu, supra note 3, at 295-96 (arguing that conscientious
objection by a physician is acceptable provided the method of refuse-and-refer is used); see
also MARY BRIODY MAHOWALD, BIOETHICS AND WOMEN: ACROSS THE LIFE SPAN 96 (2006)
(endorsing conscience-based refusal to treat in cases where risks overwhelm benefits,
including consideration of the ability of potential parents to care for potential children).
122. Appel, supra note 54, at 20-21.
123. See Child-Rearing Ability, supra note 48, at 566 (“Unless the conditions of their
employment require otherwise, physicians providing fertility services are generally free
not to provide those services to individuals as they choose, subject only to federal and
state laws against unjustified discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, ethnicity,
or disability.”); Access to Fertility, supra note 51, at 1335 (acknowledging that refusal to
treat is sometimes “based on religious or personal moral views about the propriety or
desirability of unmarried persons or gays and lesbians having children[,]” but concluding
that fertility programs must “treat single persons and gay and lesbian couples equally
with married couples in determining which services to provide” unless there are “serious 
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noted that laws banning private discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in public accommodations are becoming more numerous
and also that “moral condemnation of homosexuality or single parent-
hood is not itself an acceptable basis for limiting child rearing,
reproduction, or the activities necessary to bring them about.”124
Although it is believed that “most practitioners follow [ASRM’s
ethical] guidelines,” the guidelines themselves are in the nature of
standards for self-regulation only; non-adherence to them does not
affect a clinic’s ability to achieve accreditation under the society’s
medical practice standards and laboratory guidelines.125
Refuse-and-refer is so much a part of physicians’ conception of
good and acceptable practice that the Medical Student Section of the
AMA recently queried the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (the
“Council”) as to whether there were any limits on refuse-and-refer.126
At the height of the controversy over pharmacists who refused to
dispense emergency contraception, the students resolved that the
right of conscientious objection was available only in “non-emergent
situations” and submitted its resolution to the Council.127 The reso-
lution also sought clarification that in any instance of conscientious
objection “the physician must provide alternatives which include a
prompt and appropriate referral.”128
The report issued by the Council solidly supported refuse-and-
refer as a proper method for discontinuing treatment in many cases.129
Its analysis began with Principle I, calling upon physicians to respect
human rights and remarked that no physician may decline to accept
a patient based on invidious discrimination.130 “This is in contrast to
a physician who refuses to enter into a relationship with a patient or
refuses to provide a treatment on the basis of a conflict with his or her
religious or moral beliefs.”131 Thus, concluded the report, the most
ethical justifications for refusal are those that are medically motivated
doubts about whether they will be fit or responsible child rearers or the fact that the
program does not offer anyone a desired service”).
124. Access to Fertility, supra note 51, at 1333-34.
125. Adamson, supra note 51, at 8, 9; see Keye, supra note 50, at 537, 539 (asserting
that the ASRM guidelines are useful to physicians as a form of self-regulation and the
majority prefer this form of self-regulation over government regulation).
126. AM. MED. ASS’N RES. 5, Proceedings of the 2006 Annual Meeting of the H.D. (June
2006), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/38/a-06res.pdf.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUD. AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, PHYSICIAN OBJECTION
TO TREATMENT IN INDIVIDUAL PATIENT DISCRIMINATION, Rep. 6-A-07, at 1-2 (2007),
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja_6a07.pdf.
130. Id. at 2.
131. Id.
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rather than motivated by religious beliefs or moral conscience, but
at the very least the refusal to accept a new patient should not arise
from invidious discrimination.132 The report noted that “[t]hese ethical
precepts are . . . solidly anchored in anti-discrimination law.”133
The Council then turned to a discussion of ongoing physician-
patient relationships134 but at this point refrained entirely from
addressing discrimination. It noted that the AMA Code of Medical
Ethics does not address whether a physician can suddenly decline
treatment based on religious or moral belief.135 The closest applica-
ble principle is that “[o]nce having undertaken a case, the physician
should not neglect the patient.”136 The analysis proceeded through
a synthesis of Principles I, VI, VIII and IX to the effect that a physi-
cian has the freedom to choose whom to treat but, once she is caring
for a patient, a physician “must regard [the] responsibility to the
[patient] as paramount” and must support access to medical care for
all people.137 Since physician religious conscience can undermine auto-
nomy and access to health care, the interests must be carefully bal-
anced.138 When a physician cannot provide care for a patient because
his expertise does not extend to the required treatment or because
he is otherwise unavailable, he has the ethical obligation to provide
a redirection to other providers.139 Given these principles, the Council
concluded that, similarly, if a physician wishes to withdraw based on
religious objections, there should likewise be an appropriate referral.140
The Council’s report tells one very little beyond what can be
gleaned from a reading of the Code itself. It is disappointing, even
perplexing, that it begins with a ringing endorsement of the non-
discrimination principle but then declines to explain what the result
would be in an ongoing physician-patient relationship if the physi-
cian’s religious refusal arises from invidious discrimination. Since
the Council understands that religious conscience can undermine
autonomy and access to health care, as does discrimination, it is prob-
able, albeit far from explicit, that the Council’s report supports refuse-
and-refer as a proper response in a case where a religious refusal also
constitutes unlawful discrimination.
132. Id. at 1-2.
133. Id. at 2.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. (citing CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS Op. 8.11 (Am. Med. Ass’n 2008-2009) (Neglect
of Patient)).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 3.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Given that the AMA’s policies “are the national touchstone of
the core ethical principles that govern medical practice in the United
States today,” it is dismaying that it is not made more clear in the
Code of Medical Ethics “that the AMA explicitly and unequivocally
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (and
other protected personal characteristics), without exception.”141 The
existence in North Coast of vastly different interpretations of what
the Code requires and allows, the existence in the Code of provisions
that prohibit the neglect of patients but do not explicitly prohibit dis-
criminatory referrals, and the fact that the California Supreme Court
fully ignored all of the medical ethics arguments lodged in North Coast
are good evidence that, while the AMA Code of Medical Ethics may
embody a spirit of nondiscrimination, it does not contain language
sufficient to prevent discrimination in practice. The problem may lie
in the curious disjunction in the Code between provisions covering
potential physician-patient relationships and provisions covering
ongoing physician-patient relationships. Perhaps the problem, too,
is that the Code is not law, but is merely a set of rules that control the
admission to and the retention of membership in what is essentially
a private, voluntary association having little to do with a physician’s
ability to obtain and retain a license to practice.
I would submit that physicians’ associations have a great deal to
gain by harmonizing their codes of ethics with the rapidly expand-
ing norms of nondiscrimination that are increasingly embodied in
statutory provisions at the local, the state and, though less often,
the federal levels. Expressing commitments to expanding access to
health care, to respecting patients’ cultural differences, and to work-
ing in the interest of patients’ welfare and best interests rings hollow
when unaccompanied by strongly worded prohibitions of discrimina-
tion that explicitly attach to each and every phase of the physician-
patient relationship. This is not to say that the provisions of a code
of medical ethics must always be suitable for inclusion in the law per-
taining to medical practice. It is to say, however, that since the impor-
tance of codes of medical ethics lies in large part in their creation of
perceptions among the public about whether they can trust that phy-
sicians are guided by a professional code committed to the principle
of nondiscrimination, such codes would do well to articulate principles
of ethical behavior that do not hold physicians to a lower standard
than what is permitted by law.
141. Brief for Anti-Defamation League et al., supra note 72, at 19-20.
